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1  Introduction
The state is a key stakeholder in the humanitarian 
sector: it is states that are responsible, in law, for 
ensuring the protection and welfare of people in 
crisis – whether in their own or other countries. In 
practice, the roles that states perform in humanitarian 
crises vary: they are aid financiers and donors, service 
providers, aid recipients, partners to humanitarian 
organisations but also often conflict parties, obstacles 
to humanitarian access and violators of international 
humanitarian and human rights law. For the purpose 
of this research agenda, the state is considered 
primarily in relation to its role as a donor/financier, 
diplomat or an otherwise potentially benevolent third-
party actor in humanitarian crises. 
Although a relatively insignificant area of activity 
and interest, including compared to development 
aid, states’ engagement in international humanitarian 
action is intrinsically linked to global, regional and 
national politics. How a state seeks to achieve or 
promote its interests or objectives in relation to 
other states is a key driver of its involvement in 
humanitarian action; and how a state views itself in 
the evolving global or regional order has a substantial 
impact on its aid decisions and practices. 
Over the last decade or more, the international 
community of states engaging in humanitarian action 
– long dominated by the United States and Europe – 
has evolved significantly, in line with shifts in global 
power dynamics. Following rapid economic growth, 
many states not previously particularly active in this 
sphere are increasingly becoming global humanitarian 
actors and have been challenging traditional ‘Western’ 
approaches and leadership of the international 
humanitarian system. Between 2006 and 2015, the 
share of publicly reported international humanitarian 
assistance from non-Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) donors trebled, to 12% (DI, 2016). 
The result has been an ever-widening diversity of 
states’ aid objectives, priorities and approaches to 
humanitarian action. 
Much of the recent academic and policy discussion of 
the rise of developing countries and new powers on 
the international scene, and their role in international 
humanitarian action, has been negative. Analysis 
has focused on the differences between states, while 
offering limited consideration of the similarities in 
how states engage in humanitarian action overseas 
and what this may mean for international and non-
governmental humanitarian organisations. In reality, 
though it varies over time and in relation to different 
crises, there is one principal commonality amongst all 
states engaging in humanitarian action – the influence 
of their foreign policy agenda on their international 
humanitarian strategies, policies and decisions. 
Theoretically, the rationale for humanitarian action 
by third-party states is clearly defined in international 
law and policy: Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions asserts, in relation to situations of 
armed conflict, that states are required to ‘ensure 
respect’ for international humanitarian law,1 and in 
UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991 
and subsequent resolutions member states have 
repeatedly committed themselves to the principle 
of ‘humanity’ and to addressing human suffering in 
disasters and emergencies around the world. However, 
notwithstanding their long-held commitments to 
upholding humanitarian law and principles, it is 
1 See for example Dormann and Serralvo (2014).
With regard to humanitarian aid, this paper 
refers to assistance and activities that include 
‘the protection of civilians and those no longer 
taking part in hostilities, and the provision 
of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health 
services and other items of assistance, 
undertaken for the benefit of affected people 
and to facilitate the return to normal lives 
and livelihoods’ and which aim ‘to save lives, 
alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity 
during and in the aftermath of man-made crises 
and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and 
strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of 
such situations’ (GHD, 2003). 
Box 1: Humanitarian action
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clear that foreign policy considerations, including 
national security, the economy and trade, and the 
desire for regional and global recognition or power, 
are crucial factors in determining a state’s international 
humanitarian aid priorities, objectives and approaches. 
Whilst the relationship between a state’s foreign 
policy and its role in humanitarian action is not 
a new subject of debate, developments in recent 
years highlight the increasing complexity of the 
relationship between these two spheres of state 
action – particularly in relation to the dynamic 
changes in the global and regional order and evolving 
threats to global, regional and national security. 
This complexity can perhaps be considered as a 
conflict between interest-based and values-based 
decision-making: the tension between a state’s 
national interests and its international legal – and 
even moral – obligations. This conflict plays out for 
example in the tensions between states’ commitments 
to international humanitarian law and the pursuit 
of national security and economic objectives. This 
increasing complexity offers both opportunities 
and challenges to humanitarian organisations that 
wish to engage these states for financial, political 
or diplomatic support in achieving their own 
humanitarian objectives. A greater understanding of 
this relationship is essential if humanitarians are to 
overcome the significant challenges and exploit the 
opportunities that come with state engagement in 
humanitarian action.
This paper is part of a larger research project conducted 
by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at ODI into  
the links between a state’s foreign policy and humani-
tarian action. This preliminary paper outlines the state 
of current knowledge in this field and highlights key 
research gaps. It then sets out a series of research themes 
aimed at supporting increased understanding of the 
connections between humanitarian action and foreign 
policy, the challenges posed and the opportunities 
offered to enhance global humanitarian action.
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We are now in a new, fast evolving multipolar 
world economy – in which some developing 
countries are emerging as economic powers; 
others are moving towards becoming additional 
poles of growth; and some struggling to attain 
their potential within the new system. Robert 
Zoellick, President of the World Bank, April 
2010 (cited in Wade, 2011).
In the last decade, there has been a profound shift in 
traditional global hierarchies (Amar, 2012). The US 
and Europe have lost global influence as a number of 
states with emerging or re-emerging economies have 
sought to obtain regional and international power and 
to challenge the hegemony of these long-dominant 
Western states (Kausch, 2015: 2; Scholvin, 2010). The 
BRICS countries in particular – Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa – have gained prominent roles 
on the international stage in line with their growing 
economic power and resource wealth, and have 
sought to collaborate around a common objective of 
reshaping global governance (Scholvin, 2010; Kappel, 
2014). Recognising this, the European Union (EU) is 
forging partnerships with the BRICS (Kappel, 2014). 
Old rivalries, such as those between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia and Russia and the West, have intensified, 
while other relationships have improved, such as 
between Iran and the West. External and internal 
factors, including the UK’s Brexit decision, have raised 
serious doubts as to the future of the EU and its global 
role.2 There is also significant uncertainty about the 
trajectory of US foreign policy under the presidency of 
Donald Trump.
These new power configurations have become 
particularly prominent in relation to a series of 
global and regional political, economic and security 
developments. For the last five years, the international 
community has been grappling with a number of 
international crises: the Arab Spring and resulting 
internal armed conflict and political instability in 
a number of countries, including Libya; the armed 
conflict in Syria and its regional spill-over effects; 
the global financial crisis and its impact on major 
Western economies; and the conflict between Russian 
separatists and Ukraine. Non-Western countries have 
asserted themselves as significant actors in, and in 
some cases leaders of, the international community’s 
response to many of these crises. In particular, many 
of these states – including members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), Turkey and Brazil – 
are challenging traditional Western approaches and 
Western leadership of the international humanitarian 
response (Binder and Meier, 2011; White, 2011). 
Humanitarian policy and academic debates have 
tended to treat these non-Western states as ‘new’ or 
‘emerging’ in this field, and have made unfavourable 
comparisons with the ‘traditional’ Western states 
that engage in humanitarian action, considering 
them largely through the lens of ‘realist’ rather than 
‘liberalist’ international relations theory (Dreher 
et al., 2011; Fuchs and Klann, 2012; Binder et al., 
2010; Kragelund, 2008). Realist approaches focus on 
the concept of competition between states, and the 
rational pursuit of national interests to ensure their 
survival and power (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). In 
analysing the role of these ‘rising global actors’, it is 
important to argue different frames of reference. In 
particular, liberalists use the framing of international 
cooperation and ethics to argue that conflict is not 
inevitable, but something that can be mitigated 
through social relationships. This is built on the 
idea of an international community which pursues 
democracy, human rights and free trade, whether 
through informal or formal collective and multilateral 
structures such as the UN (Weber, 2005). 
While a useful lens, relying on the dichotomy of 
‘realist’ versus ‘liberalist’ theories of international 
relations is simplistic for several reasons. First, 
non-Western donor states such as China, Brazil, 
Russia, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have engaged in 
international aid for many decades, and many have 
long histories of charitable giving (Krebs, 2014; 
Kragelund, 2010; Li, 2012; Barakat and Zyck, 
2010; Brezhneva and Ukhova, 2013; White, 2011). 
Their terminology and definitions of aid and their 
aid practices may not reflect Western policies or 
2 The foreign policy environment 
2 See for example Politico (2016); Banks and O’Mahoney (2016); 
Chonghaile (2016); Irwin (2016).
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concepts, but these are nonetheless ‘humanitarian’ 
traditions. There are also often concerns that these 
donors conflate their humanitarian and development 
aid. The King Salman Center of Saudi Arabia, 
for example, sees humanitarian and development 
assistance as inseparable from one another, and funds 
both development projects as well as responding 
to immediate needs on the ground.3 China takes 
a similar view, and favours bilateral, government-
to-government responses. That said, DAC donor 
states too are charged with expanding previously 
agreed definitions of ‘aid’, including for example the 
domestic costs of hosting refugees and seeking to 
include some military expenditure. 
Second, all available evidence indicates that there 
is in fact huge diversity in approach, priorities and 
motivations across all donors, Western and non-
Western, with both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practices across 
the board. Looking at the larger picture, there is 
one principal commonality among all third-party 
humanitarian actors, namely that their humanitarian 
aid strategies are intrinsically tied to their foreign 
policy goals. 3 HPG interview, Riyadh, 14 February 2016. 
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3.1 National interest
There is a clear link between a state’s foreign 
policy interests and its engagement in international 
humanitarian action. Whilst this relationship has a 
long history, foreign policy has increasingly dominated 
humanitarian aid decisions in the post-9/11 period 
in particular (Macrae et al., 2002: 63). In reference 
to the US, for example, ‘the line separating the [US 
government’s] humanitarian stake from our other key 
foreign policy goals has been erased: these issues have 
become deeply embedded in one another’ (Halperin 
and Michel, 2000: 8; see also Rowlands, 2008; DI, 
2014). 
Within the broad concept of ‘foreign policy’ there 
are a number of specific factors influencing states’ 
humanitarian action, including national security, 
economic or commercial interests and the attainment 
of international and regional power or influence. The 
primacy of these factors in aid decision-making evolves 
over time, from crisis to crisis, and in relation to 
both the external environment and internal domestic 
factors.
3.1.1 Humanitarian action and national 
security
The use of humanitarian and development aid as a 
tool in national security strategies is by no means 
a new phenomenon. Aid was a key component of 
security strategies on both sides during the Cold 
War (Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007; Meernik et al., 
1998). The US targeted aid to countries aligned with 
the Soviet Union in an attempt to encourage them to 
switch allegiance, and the Soviet Union provided vast 
volumes of aid to its allies – $26 billion in 1986 alone 
(Drury et al., 2005; Brezhneva and Ukhova, 2013; 
Binder et al., 2010).
  
Since the events of 9/11, however, there has been a 
marked upward shift in this regard, with humanitarian 
action explicitly integrated in unilateral and 
multilateral efforts to ‘stabilise’ countries or areas 
deemed to pose an international security threat, such 
as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia (Collinson, Elhawary 
and Muggah, 2010; Fishtein, 2010; Bradbury and 
Kleinman, 2010; Gompelman, 2011; Gordon, 2011). 
The US military in particular has provided vast 
amounts of assistance in such contexts in order to 
obtain intelligence for military operations, to engender 
local support for its presence and to extend the 
authority of US-backed local and national authorities 
– for example, in 2013 it reported expenditure of 
$140 million in Afghanistan, mainly on infrastructure 
and water supply projects (Huber, 2015). In disaster 
response, the deployment of US military assets is 
permitted only when it also serves US national security 
interests (Oxfam, 2012; Margesson, 2013). 
The UK has also used humanitarian aid both to support 
military and security operations and in relation to 
political and security objectives. For example, despite 
its military drawdown from the region, the UK 
government has continued to use ‘humanitarian aid to 
achieve British security goals’ in the Middle East (Bryce, 
2014). The UK has spent £1.2 billion on humanitarian 
financing for Syria and the region in an effort to 
discourage refugees from attempting to reach the UK 
(Stone, 2016). The government has also repeatedly 
justified its relatively high humanitarian aid spending, 
particularly during the current period of austerity, to 
the British public by explicitly linking its aid efforts to 
national security (Slack, 2016; PMO, 2014; Holmes, 
2012; HM Treasury, 2015). 
The GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have 
also sought to use humanitarian aid to further their 
national security and strategic interests. Their more 
assertive aid and political engagement in Syria, 
Palestine and Lebanon in recent years is seen as an 
effort to address regional security threats, including 
sectarian tensions. The same is true for Turkey, whose 
humanitarian action in the Middle East had surged 
in an effort to support regional stability, even before 
the Syria conflict began (ICG, 2010). South Korea 
has focused the bulk of its aid on security interests – 
namely its relations with North Korea (Yoo, 2009; 
Binder et al., 2010). 
Humanitarian organisations have been highly 
critical of such approaches, arguing that the use 
of humanitarian aid to achieve military or security 
3 Policy drivers    
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objectives has placed beneficiaries, aid workers and 
even the entire humanitarian enterprise at significant 
risk (Oxfam, 2012; DARA, 2010; Jackson and 
Haysom, 2013; Svoboda, 2014; Moseley, 2009; 
Macdonald and Valenza, 2012). There is however 
limited concrete data to support these concerns beyond 
anecdotal accounts.
Since the events of 9/11, a number of states, including 
the US, the UK, Australia and Canada, as well as 
the EU, have adopted legal and policy measures 
aimed at curbing international terrorism. In practice, 
such measures – particularly those of the US – are 
adversely affecting the manner in which international 
humanitarian aid is provided, including the choice 
of recipient countries or organisations and even 
which populations can receive the aid some donors 
fund (Belaon, 2014; Metcalfe-Hough, Keatinge and 
Pantuliano, 2015; Mackintosh and Duplat, 2013; 
Oxfam, 2012). For example, banking restrictions on 
money transfers aimed at disrupting terrorist finances 
have also constrained aid organisations from operating 
in contexts including Somalia and Syria.
3.1.2 Economic and commercial interests
From a very practical perspective, a state’s economic 
status and economic objectives have a significant 
bearing on their engagement in international 
humanitarian action. Economic and trade interests 
influence a state’s decisions regarding what crises they 
allocate aid to and how much they give (though the 
evidence is less clear on humanitarian as opposed 
to development aid). Some research indicates that 
access to oil in recipient states is often key in the 
aid decision-making process (Fink and Radaelli, 
2009: 3). Domestic business leaders and federations 
have also been influential in aid decisions, in some 
cases lobbying for increased aid to facilitate access 
to markets in recipient countries, as was reportedly 
the case with Turkey’s engagement in Somalia 
(Binder and Erten, 2013). In the post-EU referendum 
period, the UK government has signalled that it 
is refocusing its aid budget on supporting British 
trade opportunities with developing states, though 
it is unclear whether this will include humanitarian 
as well as development assistance (see for example 
Slack, 2016; Swinford and Riley-Smith, 2016). 
The much-propagated assumption that donor 
states use aid purely to further overseas commercial 
interests is not entirely borne out by the available 
evidence. Rather, economic interests are one of 
multiple factors that influence aid decisions (Dreher 
et al., 2011). As regards China, for example, there 
is a widely held perception that its development and 
humanitarian aid is being used primarily in support 
of its business interests, for example in Myanmar and 
in a number of African countries. While this is an 
element of Chinese strategy, China too has multiple, 
competing interests in its international relations that 
go beyond simply economic, including diplomatic, 
reputational and security priorities (Hirono, 
forthcoming). 
3.1.3 Gaining political power and influence
The use of humanitarian aid to gain regional or 
international power and influence is also a common 
thread in states’ behaviour. As Scholvin (2010) and 
Rowlands (2008) discuss in relation to many so-called 
‘new’ donors, aid is often prioritised for neighbouring 
countries in an effort to attain or demonstrate regional 
leadership and influence. For example, Brazil took a 
leading role in the 2010 Haitian earthquake response, 
including co-chairing the donor conference, increasing its 
troop contribution to the UN mission MINUSTAH and 
making a significant contribution to the humanitarian 
appeal, all in an effort to demonstrate its regional 
leadership and to counter US military and political 
dominance (Binder et al., 2010). Turkey’s growing 
role as a humanitarian actor in the Middle East – both 
as a humanitarian donor and via its engagement in 
humanitarian diplomacy – is in part attributed to 
efforts to augment its standing in the region and repair 
long-standing divisions between Ankara and the wider 
Muslim world stemming from its alignment with the 
US during the Cold War (ICG, 2010; Saferworld and 
IPC, 2015). In the post-conflict response in Lebanon 
in 2006, Iran and the Sunni Gulf donor states entered 
into an extraordinary competition with each other to 
provide assistance to specific communities in an effort 
to entrench their respective political and religious 
affiliations in the country and assert their regional 
dominance (Barakat and Zyck, 2008; Barakat and Zyck, 
2010; Harmer and Martin, 2012). Similarly, Qatar has 
in recent years taken a key role in conflict mediation 
efforts in Yemen and Lebanon and between the Sudanese 
government and Darfuri rebels in an attempt ‘to burnish 
its diplomatic credentials and carve out an image as an 
important regional player’ (Barakat, 2014: 1).
Many so-called ‘new’ donor states are also often 
charged with using aid (development and humanitarian) 
to demonstrate that they are responsible members of 
the wider international community (Hirono and Neill, 
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2012: 14; Krebs, 2014a). Brazil, India and South Africa 
have reportedly used their role as international aid 
actors to further their claim to a seat on an expanded 
UN Security Council, which in turn is part of their 
on-going effort to reform global governance structures 
(Kragelund, 2010; De la Fontaine, 2007). Using aid 
to gain favour or compliance in an effort to attain or 
retain global authority is also prevalent among more 
established donors: Oxfam (2012) asserts that the 
five major Western humanitarian donors give aid to 
countries whose UN voting patterns are not aligned 
with Western states’ interests, as a means of encouraging 
their future political support. 
Humanitarian aid can also be used to improve or repair 
a donor state’s image overseas. The US Congress has 
called for more visible labelling of the relief supplies 
the US provides to conflict-affected people in Syria 
to demonstrate US ‘solidarity’ (Margesson, 2013). 
The US has also been accused of using large volumes 
of aid provided to Indonesia in the aftermath of the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and to the 2005 Pakistan 
earthquake response to repair its reputation among 
Muslims following its military operations in the Middle 
East (Jia, 2015). These efforts have not, however, been 
particularly effective, and the impact on popular opinion 
has been minimal (Wike, 2012). Other donor states 
have used similar tactics: earlier this year, Saudi Arabia 
established a $540 million relief effort – ‘Operation 
Restoring Hope’ – in Yemen and pledged to fund 
the entire UN emergency appeal for conflict-affected 
people in the country, reportedly in response to negative 
reactions at home and abroad to the impact of its 
bombing campaign on Yemeni civilians (Ghattas, 2015; 
BBC News, 2015; Al Arabiya, 2015; Arab News, 2015).
It would be wrong to assume that only these core 
foreign policy objectives influence a state’s decision 
whether, how and when to engage in overseas 
humanitarian crises. Certainly, cultural, religious and 
historical ties can also play a part. For example, in 
the Ebola response in West Africa, the US, France 
and the UK all took substantial roles in affected 
countries with which they had long-term connections 
– Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone respectively (PAC, 
2015). As Fink and Radaelli (2009: 12) conclude, 
‘former colonies are 25–30 percentage points more 
likely to receive aid after natural disasters’ from 
Western donors. Gulf states have regularly given large 
tranches of financial and in-kind support and engaged 
diplomatically in crises in their region, including 
Lebanon, Palestine and more recently Yemen. 
3.2 The humanitarian imperative
While foreign policy influence on a state’s engagement 
in humanitarian action is largely inevitable, it does 
not automatically rule out ‘humanitarian’ or moral 
considerations, particularly where this is framed as 
embodying values such as humanity and contributing 
to supra-national aims such as human rights and 
international peace and stability. Even in the US, 
which receives regular criticism for failing to uphold 
humanitarian principles, the influence of foreign 
policy varies: ‘how [humanitarian aid] is used and 
whether it becomes more of a strategic policy tool 
depends on the situation, what other governments 
are doing and the degree to which the US has 
further interest in the region’ (Margesson, 2013: 14). 
Commentators have also asserted that, although in 
the past China was unable to ‘cede a leading position 
to humanitarian principles [in its aid practice] due to 
the international political environment and China’s 
own limited economic capacity at the time’, its current 
humanitarian aid strategy ‘amply embodies the 
humanitarian character’ (Li, 2012: 50). 
States often engage in humanitarian action – whether 
through the provision of financial or in-kind aid 
or diplomatic intervention – on the basis of a 
moral or religious obligation, or out of a sense of 
solidarity. Although this is not always described in 
terms of humanitarian principles or international 
legal obligations, these concepts can be viewed as in 
alignment with the core principle of humanity. For 
example, religious obligations or practices such as 
zakat are a key driver of aid provision by Turkey 
and the GCC countries to other Muslim populations 
in need (Binder and Erten, 2013). Engagement in 
humanitarian diplomacy is seen by some governments 
as a moral obligation (Barakat, 2014), and investment 
by disaster-prone states in disaster relief operations 
overseas is motivated, at least in part, by a feeling of 
empathy with other populations going through similar 
trauma (Binder and Conrad, 2009; Binder et al., 2010; 
White, 2011; Drury et al., 2005). For many states in 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), what they regard 
as their long-held socialist, liberal ethos motivates their 
behaviour as humanitarian actors (De la Fontaine, 
2007; Kragelund, 2010; Harmer and Cotterell, 2005; 
Binder et al., 2010). Governments also often respond 
to the moral considerations and values of their own 
citizens: the UK regularly matches public donations to 
high-profile crises and funds from some GCC countries 
and Turkey are regularly combined with public 
8   Foreign policy and humanitarian action: an agenda for inquiry 
donations as part of the state’s contribution to crises in 
Somalia, Pakistan and the Middle East (Young, 2015; 
Binder and Erten, 2013). 
Humanitarian organisations often argue that foreign 
policy considerations skew donor aid allocations 
in a manner that has frequently resulted in people 
most in need of assistance being passed over in 
favour of crises of greater strategic interest to the 
donor community – evidenced, it is often said, by 
the consistent variation in funding levels for different 
crises (Harmer and Cotterell, 2005; Harmer and 
Martin, 2012; Fink and Radaelli, 2009; Oxfam, 
2012; DARA, 2010; DARA, 2011). However, it is 
also the case that states have expended the largest 
sums of aid money (billions of dollars) and, arguably, 
diplomatic effort, in the world’s largest, most acute 
and most complex humanitarian crises – such as 
Darfur in 2004–2005, the Gaza Strip in 2010 and 
Syria and neighbouring refugee-hosting states since 
2011, though admittedly with limited success in 
terms of securing an end to human suffering in 
these conflicts. Humanitarian financing provided 
by states has increased year on year, with $18.7 
billion provided in 2014, up by 24% compared 
with 2013 (GHA, 2015). Admittedly, these increases 
have not kept pace with increasing humanitarian 
demand, from protracted crises in particular: 96.6 
million people in 40-plus countries needed life-saving 
assistance in 2016, but only 46% of the costs had 
been met by October 2016, according to OCHA 
(OCHA, 2016). 
3.3 Geopolitical alliances, 
tensions and mistrust
Foreign policy is primarily concerned with how 
states engage with each other – how they position 
themselves vis-à-vis each other – and the nature of this 
relationship, the alliances and tensions between states, 
has a direct bearing on if and how they engage in new 
and on-going humanitarian crises.
Formal alliances on humanitarian action among 
Western states include global mechanisms such as 
the DAC, the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) 
initiative and donor support groups to individual 
UN agencies (Rowlands, 2008). These mechanisms 
are characterised by formalised common policies and 
benchmarks for good practice, aimed at enhancing 
the effectiveness and efficiency of collective aid 
responses. Non-Western states have tended to form 
looser bilateral or multilateral coalitions focused 
around shared values such as those of the NAM and 
the principles of South–South Cooperation. More 
recently, though, formal mechanisms for cooperation 
at regional or global level have developed, such as 
ASEAN’s Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian 
Assistance in disaster management (AHA Centre, 
established in 2011) and the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC)’s Humanitarian Affairs 
Department (ICHAD, established in 2008) (Fan and 
Krebs, 2014; Svoboda et al., 2015). These regional 
mechanisms are increasingly important in providing 
operational frameworks for neighbours or groupings 
of states to collaborate in preparing for and 
responding to crises. Such collaborations tangibly 
demonstrate solidarity and provide opportunities for 
dialogue on issues that may be less contentious at a 
regional level. 
Historically, there has been a distinct lack of effective 
cooperation on international humanitarian action 
between Western and non-Western states. Few non-
Western states participate in global humanitarian 
donor mechanisms: for example, until recently South 
Korea was the only non-DAC member of the GHD 
group (Binder et al., 2010). This lack of cooperation 
is linked to the lack of trust many Western states have 
in ‘new’ donors, believing that they will undermine 
‘good’ practices by providing support to ‘bad’ regimes 
and providing aid on the basis of strategic interests 
rather than needs (Binder and Meier, 2011; Binder et 
al., 2010; Kragelund, 2010; Rowlands, 2008; Naim, 
2007; Dreher et al., 2011; Fuchs and Klann, 2012). 
For non-Western states, engagement in these fora 
is not particularly attractive because they appear 
overly bureaucratic and are very Western-dominated 
(Rowlands, 2008; Binder and Meier, 2011). However, 
the GHD group now has a wider membership, 
including 13 non-DAC members. 
Although these distinct blocs have tended to work 
separately, more recently there has been a discernible 
push or interest in working more collaboratively on 
humanitarian action – as evidenced in the (somewhat 
‘dynamic’) relationship between Russia and the West 
on the Syria conflict, as well as EU engagement 
with the BRICS, increasing engagement from GCC 
countries in DAC fora and the collective commitments 
made by 180 states at the World Humanitarian 
Summit in 2016. There have also been some surprising 
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ad hoc bilateral alliances aimed at enhancing aid 
responses, such as the collaboration between Cuba and 
the UK in the recent international response to the West 
African Ebola epidemic, where Cuban doctors worked 
in UK-established and -run treatment centres. 
Tensions between the DAC states and China, Russia 
and other non-DAC governments often relate to 
a fundamental difference of view regarding the 
principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. 
These principles are a core element of the NAM and 
South–South Cooperation and shape the engagement 
of many of these states in humanitarian action: for 
example, most NAM countries appear to prefer to 
provide aid in natural disasters, where it is more likely 
to be coordinated through the national government, 
rather than imposed by the international community 
(White, 2011). Divergent views on these principles 
are particularly evident in relation to Western-led 
‘humanitarian intervention’ in conflict- or crisis-
affected states – a concept that the NAM states have 
specifically rejected (NAM, 2003). 
China’s strong views in this regard have caused 
particular tensions because of the country’s 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
Reflecting the position of the Chinese state, 
Chinese scholars have long rejected ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ as an instrument of power politics used 
by Western countries to achieve strategic interests 
such as regime change (Fu, 1998; Yang, 2000; Zhang 
and Pan, 2000; Wang, 2002; Chi, 2006; He, 2006; 
Chen, 2012; Huang, 2012). China’s repeated veto 
of UN Security Council action in the Syria conflict 
on this basis has drawn vociferous criticism from 
Western states and consolidated negative perceptions 
of China’s ‘humanitarian’ agenda. 
Western states’ views of non-Western states in relation 
to their aid practices are, however, contradictory 
and not entirely accurate. First, there is evidence to 
attest to the failure of OECD-DAC donor states to 
comply with the aid norms and standards they have 
committed themselves to over the years: DARA’s 
Humanitarian Response Index, for example, reveals 
that humanitarian aid decisions taken by DAC 
donors in respect of ten of the 14 most prominent 
humanitarian crises in 2010 were influenced by non-
humanitarian interests (DARA, 2010). There is also 
a wealth of literature on the use of humanitarian aid 
by Western states for military and security purposes. 
Second, non-Western donors may be outperforming 
their Western counterparts in some respects: the 
latter tend to provide far more support for national 
leadership and national capacities than OECD-DAC 
donors do despite their commitments in that regard 
(Harmer and Martin, 2012).4 
3.4 Aid decision-making 
processes and foreign policy 
influence
Some commentators have suggested that the influence 
of foreign policy on a state’s humanitarian action is in 
part related to the nature of that state’s political system 
and how this relates to the bureaucracy charged with 
managing humanitarian action. The proximity of the 
officials responsible for aid decisions to the executive 
or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is key (Arel-Bundock 
et al., 2015): the closer the relationship between aid 
decision-makers and the political and foreign policy 
hierarchy, the more likely it is that a state’s aid decisions 
will be influenced by foreign policy interests. In 
Canada, a distinct humanitarian team in the ‘integrated’ 
ministry Global Affairs Canada manages humanitarian 
spending, and the UK government established a 
separate cabinet-level ministry for aid, separate to the 
Foreign Office, in 1997. However, even where states 
have sought to structurally separate aid budgets and 
related bureaucracy, this has not necessarily insulated 
aid decisions from political or foreign policy influence, 
or meant that aid policies are more needs-based or 
principled (Rowlands, 2008). For example, the assertion 
by the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) that UK humanitarian aid ‘will be based on 
need and need alone’ contrasts starkly with the stated 
intention of former Prime Minister David Cameron to 
use aid as a tool in counter-terrorism strategies (UK 
government, 2011: 5), and more recently with new aid 
minister Priti Patel’s announcements regarding aid for 
trade. Legislative arrangements can limit the degree 
to which aid decisions are insulated from political 
decisions. For example, the US Congress has allowed a 
degree of flexibility in the prioritisation of humanitarian 
aid, but has also continued to demand that it generate 
adequate political benefits for the US through the 
visibility and branding of its aid (Margesson, 2013: 13).
4 Donor commitments on aid effectiveness are outlined in the 
Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
and the Busan Partnership Agreement for Effective Development 
Cooperation (2011). 
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4.1 Key themes in current 
knowledge
Preliminary analysis of major states’ engagement in 
humanitarian action overseas indicates that a state’s 
policy or decision-making in this area is invariably 
subject to foreign policy influence: indeed, it is 
often seen as a tool of or integral to foreign policy. 
The degree or nature of that influence appears to 
be affected by a number of discernable variables or 
factors, including: 
• the political nature of the government and domestic 
political priorities and discourse;
• economic status and interests;
• the degree to which the crisis country is of strategic 
interest, and the nature of that strategic interest, 
including security, economic interests or cultural, 
religious or historical ties; and
• the wider international or regional geopolitical 
environment.
At the same time, there is evidence that ‘humanitarian’ 
or moral concepts and values – if not formal 
humanitarian principles and legal obligations – play 
an important role in decision-making, driven more by 
considerations of international values and the benefits 
of cooperation. The humanitarian imperative and 
foreign policy objectives or interests are not always 
mutually exclusive, and the balance between them is 
highly dynamic, changing from crisis to crisis and even 
through the lifecycle of a crisis, making it difficult to 
predict accurately how a specific state will respond 
to overseas humanitarian crises in future. Whilst 
there may be more evidence of patterns of behaviour 
among the DAC states – largely because there is more 
historical analysis of these countries – a high degree 
of change is still evident in individual patterns of 
behaviour over time. 
Another emerging theme is the serious concern with 
which the humanitarian community at large views the 
link between a state’s foreign policy and its engagement 
in humanitarian action. This concern relates to what are 
perceived as inherent tensions between foreign policy 
objectives and humanitarian principles. Humanitarian 
organisations argue that the clear influence of foreign 
policy on a state’s engagement in humanitarian action 
undermines their ability to be perceived as independent, 
neutral and impartial, thereby compromising their 
safety and that of the people they are seeking to 
assist. These arguments are not always supported 
with concrete evidence of direct impact and there is 
limited analysis of how the behaviour of humanitarian 
organisations themselves – such as their funding policies 
or donor engagement – affects their ability to operate. 
Concerns about the behaviour of states are even so 
legitimate. For instance, the GHD initiative can be 
seen as an attempt by a group of Western donors to 
acknowledge and manage the tensions between their 
political and humanitarian roles. But more than ten 
years since its establishment, GHD has had no major 
impact. There is little to suggest that their members’ 
behaviour has worsened over this time but it certainly 
has not improved, as evidenced for example in 
Collinson et al. (2009)’s analysis of donor responses 
to the crises in Sri Lanka and Sudan or in the broader 
discussion of the international response to the crisis in 
Syria. Looking at the current engagement of some GCC 
states in the conflict in Yemen, their roles also raise 
serious concerns regarding stated commitments to both 
the normative framework of humanitarian action and 
their own traditional values and concepts of humanity. 
4.2 Key knowledge gaps
There is no shortage of literature that discusses 
the role and behaviour of states in relation to 
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humanitarian, and development, interventions or 
action, including how this relates to foreign policy. 
However, there are a number of important gaps 
in current knowledge and analysis. First, much 
existing literature provides general comments across 
geographically or politically aligned groups of states, 
thus ignoring the diversity and changing behaviour 
of individual states in relation to humanitarian action 
and how and why this is linked to or influenced 
by foreign policy. Second, much of the literature 
is focused on states’ roles as donors and relies on 
reported financial contributions to humanitarian 
responses to determine patterns of behaviour. Not only 
is such analysis often based on partial or inaccurate 
data sets due to the paucity of public reporting on aid 
disbursements, it also misses other significant areas 
of state action, including humanitarian diplomacy. 
Finally, and perhaps most starkly, the available 
analysis lacks in-depth discussion of where, how and 
to what extent foreign policy has been influenced by 
humanitarian considerations. 
4.3 Focus areas for future 
research
The role of third-party states in humanitarian crises 
can be critical to their resolution – to achieving 
the political agreements which end conflicts and 
other emergencies, to ensuring access to life-saving 
assistance and services and building resilience against 
future crises, as well as ensuring better protection 
of affected populations and greater access for 
humanitarian organisations in the interim. This role 
is multi-faceted, involving in-kind, financial and 
political investments. How great that investment 
is – and how effective it can be – invariably relates 
to states’ foreign policy agendas, driven, as we have 
seen, by a combination of interests and values. 
Understanding this is key to leveraging these 
investments to the benefit of those caught up in 
humanitarian crises around the world.
Most of the humanitarian literature on this topic 
automatically assumes that any links between a state’s 
foreign policy objectives and humanitarian action 
are negative, but this ignores both the historical 
reality and the potential that these links may offer 
in terms of resolving humanitarian crises. There is 
some interesting historical analysis in the foreign 
policy literature regarding how foreign policy agendas 
and the wider geopolitical context affect a state’s 
engagement in humanitarian action, such as pertaining 
to the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. 
However, there is little in-depth examination of how 
contemporary international relations are affecting 
cooperation between states engaging in crises or the 
humanitarian system at large, or what humanitarian 
diplomacy strategies are being or could be pursued. 
Such analysis may prove highly informative in terms of 
humanitarian organisations’ engagement with states, 
particularly in relation to some of the most complex, 
protracted international crises. 
Reframing consideration of non-DAC states in this 
regard would be particularly important. To date, 
discussion of their roles, motivations and potential 
has been limited because these questions have been 
analysed from a predominantly Western perspective, 
with limited engagement with representatives or other 
relevant actors in those states. Engaging directly with 
these actors, from an objective perspective, could 
provide a more in-depth understanding of the current 
and potential links and areas of collaboration between 
states and with other humanitarian actors.
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